Randomness is an important resource for many applications, from gambling to secure communication. However, guaranteeing that the output from a candidate random source could not have been predicted by an outside party is a challenging task, and many supposedly random sources used today provide no such guarantee. Quantum solutions to this problem exist, for example a device which internally sends a photon through a beam-splitter and observes on which side it emerges, but, presently, such solutions require the user to trust the internal workings of the device. Here we seek to go beyond this limitation by asking whether randomness can be generated using untrusted devices-even ones created by an adversarial agent-while providing a guarantee that no outside party (including the agent) can predict it. Since this is easily seen to be impossible unless the user has an initially private random string, the task we investigate here is private randomness expansion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are important in a wide range of applications. In some, for example statistical sampling or computer simulations, pseudo-randomness may be sufficient. However, in others, such as gambling or cryptography, the use of pseudo-randomness may be detrimental-a shrewd adversary might identify and exploit any deviation from true randomness. Since quantum measurements are the only physical processes we know of that appear to be intrinsically random, it is natural to try to design quantum random number generators. In fact, devices which generate randomness through quantum measurement are commercially available 1 . However, to be convinced that the outputs of these devices are random and private, i.e. unknown to any third party, the user must either trust or verify that they are built to a specified design.
It would be desirable if users could instead guarantee the privacy of their newly generated random strings solely by tests on the outputs of their devices. This would eliminate the need for a complicated and time-consuming verification that the devices are functioning according to design and contain no accidental or deliberate security flaws. A protocol requiring only tests on device outputs is said to be device-independent.
The notion of device-independent cryptography was * rcolbeck@perimeterinstitute.ca † a.p.a.kent@damtp.cam.ac.uk 1 For example, www.idquantique.com. first introduced by Mayers and Yao [1] , although with hindsight it could be argued that the seed of the idea was already implicit in the Ekert key distribution protocol [2] . Proving device-independent security of cryptographic tasks is a challenging task. The first quantum key distribution protocol with proven device-independent security was devised by Barrett et al. (BHK) [3] 2 . Although the BHK protocol provided a crucial proof of principle, it achieves provable general security at the price of low efficiency. The idea was subsequently developed, producing more efficient protocols provably secure against restricted classes of attack [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] and then against general attacks [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 3 .
Here we consider a different task, private randomness expansion. The aim is to use an initially private random string to generate a longer one, in a way that guarantees that the longer string is also kept private from all other parties. In this paper, we investigate the task of private randomness expansion within the deviceindependent paradigm. This task was first introduced in [15] (the work presented here is essentially a condensed version of Chapter 5 of [15] ) and has been subsequently developed [16] .
In the latter work, Pironio et al. analyse a protocol related to the one in [15] (they use the CHSH inequality instead of GHZ tests) and present a security analysis for a restricted class of attacks (ones in which an adversary is forced to measure any quantum systems they hold prior to performing privacy amplification). Furthermore, they report an experimental demonstration of their protocol.
Quantum private randomness expansion is an important cryptographic task in its own right, but also has some features in common with quantum key distribution, so device-independent protocols and security proofs for this task should also shed light on analogous results for quantum key distribution. Conversely, any secure protocol for device-independent key distribution that generates a secret key longer than the amount of randomness used in the protocol could also be used for randomness expansion by performing both sides of the key-generation protocol in a single laboratory. Candidate protocols of this type have recently been proposed (see above); at present they require a large number of isolated devices (cf. Footnote 3). Obviously, it would be preferable not to require this practically challenging constraint, all else being equal.
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There is one significant new insight in the present work that has not appeared previously: the protocols given in [15] and [16] are not secure in a composable way. On the contrary, there are quite plausible scenarios in which the final private random string output by these protocols can become partly compromised, in which case the protocol is evidently insecure. The protocol we present here has hence been slightly modified from the one given in [15] (see Section IV for further explanation).
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Our protocol is intended to allow an honest user, Bob, to input a sufficiently long initial private random string to devices constructed by a potential adversary, Eve, and obtain as output a finite longer private random string. We also propose using this protocol within an extended one to allow an initial private random string to generate an arbitrarily long private random output string. Our extended protocol has the undesirable feature of requiring a large number of devices (dependent on the amount of expansion required) which must be prevented from communicating with one another. In both protocols, the length of initial string required depends on the tolerance for risking successful cheating by Eve. Neither protocol is optimized for efficiency.
Proving security of our protocols against the most general possible attacks remains an open question. The aim of this work is rather to introduce the task, to propose some candidate protocols for its solution, and to explain some intuitions that suggest they are good can-didates to examine further. In so doing we should stress that, while the history of quantum cryptography shows that initially unproven intuitions can spark major advances-indeed the subject was originally founded on such intuitions [17, 18] -it also shows that they should be approached critically and finally accepted only if and when proven.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
1. Bob's laboratory is secure. In particular, secret messages cannot be sent from Eve's devices, once within his laboratory, to the outside world 6 , and Eve cannot probe his laboratory from outside.
2. Bob can isolate any devices in his laboratory, preventing them from sending any signal outside an isolated region. 3. Bob has secure classical information processing devices 8 , with secure authenticated classical communication between them within his laboratory. 9 In particular, Eve's devices are unable to spoof classical communications within Bob's laboratory; they can output to Bob's classical devices only via prescribed channels.
4. Eve is constrained by the laws of quantum theory.
5. All communication channels and devices operate noiselessly 10 .
Note that we do not include the common assumption that Bob has complete knowledge of the operation of the devices he uses to implement the protocol. Instead, we suppose that all quantum devices were sourced from 6 Without this, the task is impossible, since the devices could simply broadcast their inputs and outputs. 7 For example, by placing them each in their own sub laboratory.
Alternatively, when it is sufficient to prevent communication between the devices during a protocol of finite duration, if we assume the impossibility of faster-than-light signalling, Bob can isolate the devices by placing them at appropriately space-like separated locations during the protocol. (Bob could ensure such separation using trusted classical clocks and rulers.) 8 If Bob cannot trust any classical information processing device-including his own brain-then he is beyond the help of cryptographers. 9 Since Eve's devices can be isolated (cf. Assumption 2), we assume that any authentication procedures used do not need to consume secret randomness; of course, if they do, this randomness should be included in the accounting. 10 This assumption is in practice unrealistic and one would hope to eventually drop it. Its main purpose is to keep the protocols and security proofs as simple as possible in the first instance.
an untrusted party, Eve, who may construct them using complete knowledge of Bob's protocol. From Bob's perspective, these devices are simply black boxes with inputs and outputs.
We briefly consider weakening the assumption that Eve is constrained by quantum theory at the end of the paper.
B. Non-classical correlations
Bob will want to perform tests on the devices supplied by Eve. We assume Bob's testing protocol is known publicly, and in particular is known to Eve, but that it may involve random inputs which are not known to Eve. Indeed, a little thought shows that this is essential for any unconditionally secure protocol. Without private random inputs, Eve knows Bob's entire protocol. To be useful, the protocol must have at least one valid set of outputs. Eve can then calculate such a set in advance and supply her devices with classical records of these precalculated outputs, thus ensuring both that the devices pass Bob's tests and that she knows in advance all the data they generate for Bob. Clearly, Bob cannot generate any private random data in this scenario.
We thus assume that Bob begins with a private random string, and is interested in generating a longer one, i.e. in private randomness expansion. He needs to ensure that Eve cannot pre-calculate classical data that she can supply to her devices in order to pass his tests-otherwise she can predict all the output data that will be generated for any given random input, and so he cannot generate any new private randomness. Bob must thus ensure that his tests cannot be passed (except perhaps with a small probability) by devices whose outputs can be described by a local hidden variable model. To do so, Bob needs to perform some form of Bell test, in which the devices are prevented from signalling to one another, either by physical barriers or by being space-like separated, to ensure the presence of non-classical correlations. Secure private randomness expansion is thus impossible without Bell tests.
Our intuition is that, conversely, in suitable protocols, Bell tests make private randomness expansion possible. Roughly speaking, the underlying idea is that states that produce non-classical correlations possess some intrinsic randomness, uncorrelated with any other system in the universe. So, by verifying the presence of such correlations, Bob can be sure that Eve's devices are using such states and hence that he derives genuine private randomness from them. The hypothesis is then that, in order to pass Bob's verification with a significant probability of success, Eve's strategy must be so close to the honest one that she cannot gain significant information about Bob's newly generated private randomness.
The protocols used in this work are based on the following test, which we call a GHZ test [19] 11 . Bob asks for three devices, each of which has two settings (which we label P i and Q i for the ith device) and can output either 1 or −1. We use p i and q i to denote the values of the outputs when inputs P i and Q i are made. Bob chooses one of the four triples of settings given by P 1 P 2 P 3 , P 1 Q 2 Q 3 , Q 1 P 2 Q 3 and Q 1 Q 2 P 3 , obtaining a result given by the product of outputs corresponding to the specified inputs: for example, if his inputs are P 1 P 2 P 3 he obtains outcomes p 1 , p 2 and p 3 . He demands that the product p 1 p 2 p 3 is −1, while p 1 q 2 q 3 , q 1 p 2 q 3 and q 1 q 2 p 3 are +1. That these cannot be satisfied by a classical assignment [19] can be seen by considering the product of the four quantities. According to Bob's demands, this must be −1, while the algebraic expression obtained by a classical assignment is p , which must be +1. If, instead, the {p i } and {q i } are obtained from the outcomes of measurements acting on an entangled quantum state, then Bob's demands can always be met. In the Appendix, the complete set of operators and states which do this is derived. In essence, all such operators behave like Pauli σ x and σ y operators and the state behaves like a GHZ state,
(|000 − |111 ), up to local unitaries.
III. PRIVATE RANDOMNESS EXPANSION A. Security Definitions
In this section, we define what it means for a string to be private and random. We say that S is a private random string with respect to a system E if the joint state of the string and E takes the form
for some state σ E , where the sum runs over all possible instances, s, of the string S and the superscript I stands for "ideal" 12 . The key properties of this state are that the E system is uncorrelated to S, and that the possible instances of s are uniformly distributed.
In practice, it will not be possible to guarantee a state of this form. Instead, we may have a state
where the superscript R stands for "real". We say that the string S in this state is a δ-private random string with respect to E if there exists a σ E such that
The trace distance is related to the optimal probability of guessing which of two states one has. Its operational significance is that if D(ρ, τ ) ≤ δ, then no physical procedure allows one to distinguish between ρ and τ with success probability greater than δ. Moreover, since the trace distance is non-increasing under quantum operations [20] , this condition must persist when the string is used in any application.
In private randomness expansion, typically the raw outputs of the devices are not δ-private for a sufficiently small δ, and require privacy amplification in order to reduce δ to an acceptable level for security. This is described in detail in the next subsection.
It is impossible to devise a finite device-independent cryptographic protocol that guarantees non-trivial security for any task with complete certainty. Eve can always follow the strategy of guessing the random input string and supplying appropriate pre-computed outputs: this has a nonzero probability of success. In particular, it is impossible to construct a private randomness expansion protocol that guarantees that the final string is δ-private (for small δ) against an arbitrary attack by Eve. Our security criterion thus involves two parameters. We demand that for any strategy chosen by Eve, the a priori probability that the protocol does not abort and the final string is not δ-private is at most ζ, where δ and ζ are suitably small. We say that a protocol with this property is a ζ-secure protocol that generates a δ-private string 13 . Since δ and ζ are small, Eve has only a small probability of learning a significant amount of information about the final string without causing the protocol to abort.
B. Privacy Amplification
Privacy amplification takes an initial string, X ′ , about which a potential adversary has partial knowledge, E, and compresses it to a shorter string, S, which is approximately uniformly distributed and independent of the adversary's knowledge. This typically requires some additional randomness, R, to select the function, f , from some set of functions, F , used for the compression. The idea is that by choosing the set F appropriately, the final string, S, is very close to being private and random (according to the definition given in the previous section). Furthermore, we require that the string S is very close to independent of the randomness, R, used to choose the function.
Privacy amplification was first studied in the case where the adversary's knowledge, E, is classical (see for example [21] [22] [23] ) and was later extended to the case 13 A protocol that never aborts is thus ζ-secure if the a priori probability that the final string is δ-private is at most ζ.
of quantum knowledge [24] [25] [26] . In the latter works, it was shown that the length of extractable private random string can be characterized in terms of the smooth conditional min-entropy of the initial string, X ′ , given the knowledge, E, the quantum version of which was first introduced in [26] .
The smooth min-entropy can be defined not only for strings, X ′ , but for any quantum state on a system, B. We first define the non-smooth min-entropy of B given E for a state ρ BE :
where the maximization is over normalized density operators, σ E . The ǫ-smooth conditional min-entropy of B given E is then defined by
where the maximization is over a set of positive (and potentially sub-normalized) operators ǫ-close to ρ with respect to some distance measure 14 . We consider the use of two-universal hash functions for privacy amplification which are defined as follows [28, 29] : Definition 1. A set of functions, F from X ′ to S is two-universal if when f r ∈ F is picked using a uniform random variable R, for any distinct instances, x ′ 1 and x ′ 2 , of X ′ , the probability that they give the same values of
We remark that other appropriate functions could be used instead-we would like a class of functions with the fewest members. In particular, privacy amplification schemes based on Trevisan's extractor [30] have recently been shown to be secure even when the information E is quantum, and in general require a shorter seed than schemes using two-universal hash functions [31] . To simplify the discussion, given that we do not analyse optimality or security against general attacks, we focus on two-universal hashing here.
Including the classical spaces used to define the string, X ′ , and the random string used to choose the hash function, R, the state we have prior to privacy amplification has the form
where P R (r) = 1 |R| . After applying the hash function f r ∈ F , the state takes the form
where
Ideally, the state of the system in H S would look uniform from Eve's point of view, even if she were to learn R (functions for which this property holds are sometimes called strong extractors). The variation from this ideal can be expressed in terms of the trace distance between the state and an ideal,
where τ S is the maximally mixed state in H S and σ ER is an arbitrary state. This distance is bounded in the following theorem [26] .
Theorem 1. If f r is chosen from a two-universal set of hash functions, F , using a uniform random string, R, which is uncorrelated with S and E, and is used to map X ′ to S as described above, then for |S| = 2 t and ǫ ≥ 0, we have
Hence, if Bob chooses t = H ǫ min (X ′ |E) − ℓ, for some ℓ ≥ 0, he can use a random string, R, to compress his string, X ′ , which is partly correlated with a quantum system held by Eve, to a δ-private string, S, for some
We remark that privacy amplification is usually discussed in a three party scenario, in which Alice and Bob seek to generate a shared random string on which Eve's information is negligible. Alice and Bob are required to communicate during the amplification stage, and thus leak information (in our case the random string R) about the amplification process to Eve. Private randomness expansion, on the other hand, is a task involving only Bob, who aims to generate data secret from Eve. No information need be leaked in amplification since there is no second honest party needing to perform the same procedure. The random string R hence remains private with respect to Eve 15 .
IV. PROTOCOLS
We begin this section by giving a protocol which is designed to allow a private random string to be expanded by a finite amount. Before performing the protocol, Bob asks Eve for three devices, each of which has two settings (inputs), (P i and Q i for the ith device) and can make two possible outputs, +1 or −1. Bob asks that whenever these devices are used to measure one of the four GHZ quantities (P 1 P 2 P 3 , P 1 Q 2 Q 3 , Q 1 P 2 Q 3 and 16 . Furthermore, he asks that these devices can satisfy these conditions without communicating. We call these three devices taken together a device triple. Bob uses his device triple in the following protocol.
Protocol 1
This protocol depends on parameters ζ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0 and can be applied to an initial private string X 17 . Although we express it for the case of GHZ tests and two-universal hashing, it is easily adapted to other Bell tests or privacy amplification functions.
1. Bob sets up the device triple such that the devices cannot communicate with one another (cf. Assumption 2), nor send any information outside Bob's laboratory (cf. Assumption 1).
2. Bob divides his string X into two strings X 1 and R (the relative lengths of these strings depends on the choice of function used for privacy amplification in
Step 6).
3. Bob uses two bits of X 1 to choose one of the four tests which he performs, ensuring that each device learns only its input (and not the whole string X 1 ). He brings all the output bits together.
4. If he receives the wrong product of outputs, he aborts 18 , otherwise he turns his output into two bits using an appropriate assignment (for each test there are four possible valid output combinations). In this way, Bob builds a random stringX.
5. Bob repeats steps 3 and 4 until he has exhausted X 1 .
6. Bob concatenates X 1 andX to form a new string X ′ . He computes a suitable value γ := γ(|X 1 |, ζ, δ), where |X 1 | is the number of possible input strings, δ is the desired privacy parameter for the output string, and ζ is the a priori risk he will tolerate 16 In practice, Bob might ask for devices that measure either σx or σz, and for a further device that creates GHZ states. However, he will not be able to distinguish such devices from another set satisfying the test but using a different set of states and operators. We have kept the description in terms of things he can verify. 17 For any finite length of initial string, there will be minimum values of ζ and δ below which the protocol never increases the length of the string. 18 In a more general protocol tolerating noise, Bob need not abort.
Instead, he would collect statistics on when the devices generate outcomes with the wrong product, and use these to bound the min-entropy in Step 6. that the output string is not δ-private 19 . He performs privacy amplification on X ′ to form a string of length log |S| = γ bits which, with a priori probability greater than (1 − ζ), is δ-private. In the case of two-universal hashing, R and X ′ have equal length [25, 26] 20 and so Bob should partition X = (X 1 , R) such that 2 log 2 |X 1 | = log |R|.
The protocol's output is the concatenated string (S, R).
The entire setup is shown in Figure 1 .
If Eve is constrained by quantum theory, then the only way she can be certain to pass all of Bob's tests is if the joint state shared by the devices is pure and generates unbiased outcomes (see the Appendix). This strategy gives no information to Eve. Moreover, in this case, two bits of X 1 generate two new bits of randomness each time 19 In noise-tolerant protocols, γ := γ(|X 1 |, T, ζ, δ), where T is the number of tests passed. In either the noiseless or the noisetolerant case, finding an explicit form of the function γ that provably has the desired properties remains an open problem: see the comments later in this section. Note also that γ may be zero if any of the parameters are too small. 20 More recently, it has been shown that a shorter R roughly equal to the size of the output, S, can be used [32] . In the context of the present protocol, unless there are significant levels of cheating or noise, we do not expect that this will have a significant effect on the rate.
the loop is performed. This is an attractive feature of the GHZ-based protocol: the same operations are used both to test security and to generate new random bits. Furthermore, if Bob trusts Eve, he can forego the privacy amplification step and the shorter protocol is very efficient, doubling the length of the random key. That said, of course, the aim is to protect Bob against a potentially dishonest Eve who can prepare the devices to include any quantum systems, which may be entangled with one another and also with an ancillary system kept under Eve's control. She may also prepare the devices with any quantum program to produce outputs from inputs 21 . It remains an open problem to find a function γ(|X 1 |, ζ, δ) (or γ(|X 1 |, T, ζ, δ) in the noise-tolerant case) such that the protocol is ζ-secure. Since Eve is constrained by quantum theory, the joint quantum state of the system Bob uses to store X ′ and Eve's systems has the form
E prior to privacy amplification. Here, the information, E, should include any additional information about the protocol that Eve might possibly infer from data that Bob is not required by the protocol to keep private (and in realistic applications may not necessarily be able to keep private): for example, the length of the final private random string, whether the protocol aborted, or how many rounds were performed 22 . We would then like a statement which says that, for any ζ > 0, there exists some calculable ℓ ≥ 0 such that, for any strategy used by Eve, we have p ≤ ζ, where p is the probability (averaged over all possible initial random strings X) that (i) the protocol does not abort and (ii) the min-entropy fails to satisfy H ǫ min (X ′ |E) ≥ γ − ℓ. Conversely, if the min-entropy satisfies this bound, it follows that the string S (of length γ) formed by hashing X ′ is δ-private for δ = (ǫ + 23 . Intuition suggests-as a working hypothesis awaiting full analysis-that, in order to ensure a reasonable probability of the protocol not aborting, Eve cannot deviate much from her honest strategy, and so the string produced by a successful run of the protocol almost certainly satisfies H ǫ min (X ′ |E) 2 log 2 |X 1 | for some suitably small ǫ. The length of the final output string would then be log 2 |R| + t ≈ 4 3 log 2 |X| − ℓ, i.e. the protocol would in- 21 In principle, Eve may also design the devices so as to attempt to send any quantum signals to one another, according to any algorithm of her choice. However this is pointless if, as in our protocol, Bob prevents such signalling. 22 One can imagine scenarios in which no such information is in fact ever leaked to Eve. However, for unconditional and composable security, Bob's final string should remain private and random even if such information becomes known to Eve. See the discussion at the end of this section for some realistic scenarios in which this concern applies. 23 Since it is only quantum devices that are supplied by Eve, and hashing is a classical procedure, there is no security issue associated with this step.
crease the length of the string by a factor close to 4 3 . (For a long enough initial string, a given level of security can be achieved with ℓ ≪ log 2 |X|.)
It is important to note that the string generated by our protocol, although private with respect to Eve, is not private with respect to the devices, which could be programmed to remember their output bits. The generated random string thus cannot be treated as defining an effectively independent new input string for the same devices. Furthermore, it is important that Bob prevents the devices from sending signals outside his laboratory until the private randomness is no longer required.
Attacks on the initially private string
In earlier work on randomness expansion [15, 16] it was argued that there is no need to include X 1 in the string undergoing privacy amplification, the argument being that since X 1 is only used to do operations within Bob's laboratory, it always remains secure against the outside and hence can be included in the final private string without any processing. However, we argue here that there are reasonable scenarios in which, on the contrary, Eve could learn part of X 1 despite the security of Bob's laboratory. Protocols in which X 1 is left unprocessed in the final string do not have universally composable security, and indeed are evidently insecure in some reasonable applications.
We illustrate this point by giving a particular strategy which gives Eve a significant probability of learning some bits of X 1 . Suppose Eve programs the devices such that the protocol aborts unless a set of m specified bits of X 1 take specific values 24 . For small m, Eve can ensure the devices behave in this way while keeping the probability of the protocol not aborting significantly above zero. If the string X 1 remained a truly a private random string, this property should persist if Bob announces whether the protocol aborted or not (see also Footnote 22) . However, if Eve uses this strategy, the knowledge that the protocol did not abort would convey to Eve the values of the m specified bits of X 1 25 . To make this point more concrete, imagine that Eve knows that Bob's casino relies on purportedly private random bits that are output from this protocol for tonight's operations. If the protocol aborts, Eve knows 24 Eve can do this by fixing pre-specified outputs whose product is −1 for these bits, so that they are valid outputs for input P 1 P 2 P 3 but not for any other input. Alternatively, she can prespecify outputs that are invalid: for example, the devices could be programmed to output 2 (or to fail to make an output) for any input except P 1 Q 2 Q 3 . 25 Eve also has more general attacks of this type that allow her to learn some information about some bits: for instance, she can pre-specify some outputs whose product is 1, which will be valid for inputs P 1 Q 2 Q 3 , Q 1 P 2 Q 3 and Q 1 Q 2 P 3 but will cause an abort (in the noiseless case) if the input is P 1 P 2 P 3 .
the casino will not open tonight. However, there is a significant chance that the protocol will not abort, and the casino will open tonight. Moreover, Eve knows that, if the casino does open, it will continue to run until the purportedly private random bit string that Bob has generated is exhausted. Eve can thus gain information about some bits conditioned on the casino opening, or staying open, and profitably bet on the relevant bits. Clearly, this is not consistent with a sensible definition of private randomness. Note that the protocol in [16] is equally vulnerable to attacks of this kind 26 . In our protocol, the idea is to avoid this problem by performing privacy amplification on X 1 as well as onX. Another possible strategy is to look for protocols that are efficient enough in generating new randomness that even if X 1 is discarded prior to privacy amplification, the final private random string is longer than the original. The original random string can then simply be discarded after use. Protocols based on higher dimensional generalizations of the GHZ test appear to be good candidates of this type (see the next section). Other classes of candidates are protocols in which the inputs to the devices correspond to tests only on a relatively small (randomly chosen) subset of the rounds, with deterministic inputs used for the remainder, or to protocols in which the inputs are chosen with a non-uniform distribution that requires a relatively small amount of randomness to sample from.
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Iteration via Isolation
The protocol we have presented aims to expand a finite initial random string by a finite additional amount. However, it is natural to ask whether indefinite expansion of a finite random string is possible. We now present an extended protocol which suggests that this may, in principle, be achievable 28 . However, this protocol has the disadvantage that it requires a large number of additional devices. In the extended protocol, Bob asks Eve for N device triples and arranges them such that no two 26 Strictly speaking, as presented, the protocol in [16] never aborts, although it may fail to increase the length of the initially private random seed string. However, it is vulnerable to an attack in which Eve uses the length of the final generated key to infer information about the purportedly still private random seed. A fix for this is discussed in the following footnote. 27 This tactic is used in the protocol in [16] . Although, as presented, the protocol in [16] is vulnerable to the attack discussed here, this could be fixed by simply discarding the relevant part of the initial string. Doing so makes the potential insecurity of the initial string irrelevant, but of course may significantly affect the accounting in practical implementations. For example, if applied to the reported experiment in [16] , it would mean the final private random string produced is actually shorter than the initial private random string. 28 Again, we stress that rigorous analysis remains a task for the future.
can communicate, e.g. by placing them in their own sublaboratories. He then performs Protocol 1 using the first device triple, generating a new string (S, R). This is then used to perform Protocol 1 on the second device triple and so on 29 . To get started, this extended protocol requires that the initial private random string is sufficiently long that it can be securely expanded.
V. TESTS BASED ON OTHER CORRELATIONS
In this section we discuss some alternative ways of constraining Eve rather than demanding that her outputs satisfy GHZ tests, with a view to improving the rate (i.e., the length of private random string generated by a given length of initial private random string) while keeping the number of devices required relatively small. One promising family of correlations come from direct generalizations of the GHZ correlations to more parties, as conceived by Pagonis, Redhead and Clifton (PRC) [33] . Their family of tests is such that in the kth version of this test, 4k − 1 devices are required to measure one of 4k quantities (i.e., log 2 (4k) bits of randomness are required per test), while generating 4k − 2 bits of randomness.
(The case k = 1 corresponds exactly to the GHZ test.)
For example, in the case k = 2, Bob asks for seven of the two-input, two-output devices discussed previously and considers measuring one of the the eight combinations
He demands that the products of the outputs for the first seven combinations are always +1 and for the last combination, the product of the outputs should be −1. This can be achieved using PRC's 7-party generalization of the GHZ state. For this test, 3 bits of randomness are required to choose amongst the eight settings, while in a successful implementation of the test on this state, 6 bits of randomness are generated by the output. If Bob trusts Eve, the private random string is tripled in length and for larger k, the expansion is even more dramatic.
Such tests thus look like very good candidates for private randomness expansion. However, of course, we still need to introduce privacy amplification to protect Bob against a dishonest Eve. Using log 2 |X 1 | bits of private randomness we can perform log 2 |X1| log 2 (4k) tests, generating (approximately) log 2 |X1| log 2 (4k) (4k − 2) new bits. If one uses two-universal hashing for privacy amplification, 29 A word of caution: at present Theorem 1 is only proven to hold in the case that the randomness used to choose the function is perfectly uniform and perfectly uncorrelated with S and E.
then in order to choose the hash function, we require log 2 |R| = log 2 |X1| log 2 (4k) (4k − 2) + log 2 |X 1 | bits. We also have log 2 |X| = log 2 |X 1 | + log 2 |R|, hence the length of final string is (approximately) 2k−1 log 2 (4k)+2k−1 log 2 |X| bits longer than the original. Hence, in the limit of large k, we would intuitively expect the analogous protocols to roughly double the length of private random string. Furthermore, if a function requiring shorter R were used for privacy amplification (e.g. that of [31] ), the rate increase with k is potentially greater.
Even if such tests do improve the rate of random string expansion, though, there are trade-offs. Firstly, more devices are needed and, secondly, it seems likely that a longer initial private string is required in order to achieve a given level of security. The intuition behind this second statement comes from considering a classical attack. For a GHZ test, a classical attack can escape detection with probability One could also use a test based on the CHSH correlations [34] , as considered in [16] . CHSH-based protocols do not have the convenient cheat-detection property that protocols based on GHZ correlations (and their generalizations) possess in the noiseless case: for tests based on CHSH correlations one can never be completely certain that cheating has been identified. Nor do they have the appealing property that correlation tests can be directly used as new random bits in the case where Eve is honest. These features of GHZ-based protocols have, at least, some pedagogical value, allowing as they do a simple explanation of the basic idea of random string expansion. However, as far as we are aware, it is generally an open question to identify which class of Bell violation allows the most efficient private randomness expansion protocols for a given set of parameters |X|, ζ, δ and for a given costing of the various cryptographic and physical resources involved.
VI. DISCUSSION
Private randomness expansion may be a useful primitive on which to base other protocols in the untrusted device scenario. More fundamentally, we can think of nature as our untrusted adversary which provides devices. One could then argue that our protocols strengthen the belief that nature genuinely generates randomness 30 . The untrusted devices scenario is a realistic one, and seems likely to become important if quantum computers or quantum cryptosystems become widespread. Ordinary users will not want to construct their own hardware and will instead turn to suppliers, just as users of classical computers and encryption software do today. The protocols in this paper are designed with the ultimate aim of offering such users a virtual guarantee that the devices supplied are behaving in such a way that their outputs are private and random.
Finally, we note the possibility of the given protocols being secure even against an adversary who is not bound by quantum theory. As BHK first showed ( [3] ; see also [10] [11] [12] ), quantum key distribution protocols can be provably secure even against such an adversary, provided certain signalling constraints can be guaranteed. In the case of our private randomness expansion protocol, the post-quantum adversary is analogously constrained: we assume that Bob can ensure there is no signalling between any of the devices held separately in his laboratory, nor between any of them and Eve. It is a further open problem to provide a security proof in this scenario.
We expect that, if additional private randomness can be securely generated by our protocol in this postquantum scenario, it will be at a lower rate than in the quantum case, since Eve has more general attacks available.
For instance, Eve can exploit the power of so-called non-local (NL) boxes-hypothetical devices that maximally violate the CHSH inequality. In the notation introduced in Section II B, the device's outputs satisfy p 1 p 2 = −1 and p 1 q 2 = p 2 q 1 = q 1 q 2 = 1 [35, 36] . By using NL boxes, Eve can always know the output of one of the devices. For example, if she sets the third device to output 1 and the first two to obey the NL box conditions given above, she will always pass a GHZ test. It is therefore clear that at most one bit of private randomness would result from each test (rather than close to two bits if Eve uses a quantum strategy).
Q 1 ⊗P 2 ⊗Q 3 |Ψ = |Ψ (10)
Here |Ψ is the tripartite state. (We consider the case of pure states since the mixed state case follows immediately from it.) We then have 23 , where λ i ≥ 0 ∀ i, and n is the dimensionality of the first system. Then, if λ i = 0 ∀ i, the {|i 1 } are n eigenstates of P 1 ,Q 1 , each having eigenvalue 0. Since there are only n eigenstates, we must have P 1 ,Q 1 = 0.
If some of the λ i are zero, then we can define a projector onto the non-zero subspace. Call this Π 1 , and definê p 1 = Π 1P1 Π 1 andq 1 = Π 1Q1 Π 1 . Similarly, define projectors Π 2 and Π 3 , and hence operatorsp 2 ,q 2 andp 3 ,q 3 by taking the Schmidt decomposition for systems (1, 3) and 2, and (1,2) and 3, respectively. It is then clear that (2) . The operators may form a reducible representation, in which case we can construct a block diagonal matrix with irreducible representations on the diagonal. The anti-commutator property means that only the two-dimensional representation can appear, hence we can always pick a basis such thatp i = 1 1 di ⊗ σ xi and q i = 1 1 di ⊗ σ y i for some dimension, d i , of identity matrix. Our state then needs to satisfy 1 1 d1 ⊗ σ x1 ⊗ 1 1 d2 ⊗ σ x2 ⊗ 1 1 d3 ⊗ σ x3 |Ψ = − |Ψ , and similar relations for the other combinations analogous to (9) (10) (11) . By an appropriate swap operation, this becomes 1 1 d1d2d3 ⊗ σ x1 ⊗ σ x2 ⊗ σ x3 |Ψ = − |Ψ , etc., which makes it clear that the system can be divided into subspaces, each of which must satisfy the GHZ relation (12 (|000 − |111 ), and the complex coefficients {a j } simply weight each subspace and satisfy j |a j | 2 = 1. (Note that |ψ j = |ψ GHZ is the only solution to (σ x1 ⊗ σ y 2 ⊗ σ y 3 + σ y 1 ⊗ σ x2 ⊗ σ y 3 + σ y 1 ⊗ σ y 2 ⊗ σ x3 − σ x1 ⊗ σ x2 ⊗ σ x3 ) |ψ j = 4 |ψ j , up to global phase.)
We have hence obtained the complete set of states and operators satisfying (8) (9) (10) (11) , up to local unitaries.
